

Research Paper



Assessing the impact of international intervention on justice indicators: a statistical evaluation of legal compliance, judicial independence, and crime reduction

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
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ABSTRACT

The research presented here examines the impact of international intervention in justice-related indices over a wide range of countries. We utilized a dataset that consisted of 200 observations to measure the groups with and without intervention against four important variables: Human Rights Score, Judicial Independence Score, International Legal Compliance, and Crime Rate Index. Through descriptive statistics, the intervention countries were significantly consistently seen with better governance and lower crime metrics. The use of Welch's ANOVA and assumption checks via Levene's test and Shapiro-Wilk normality testing were among the statistical analyses that validated these differences as being statistically significant. The use of Q-Q plots and mean plots with confidence intervals further corroborated these findings. The conclusion drawn from the results is that international interventions are positively related to the integrity of the judiciary, the enforcement of the law, and the reduction of crime rates. These outcomes are of great importance because they not only provide empirical support for the global legal collaboration and intervention strategies that aim to further strengthen the justice systems but also for the policies favoring such scenarios.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Justice and human rights are essential elements of democracy and are very much in the center of the national and international legal frameworks. The justice promotion mainly through the independence of the judiciary, legal compliance, and human rights protection—has become more and more the point around which international measures to states having a legal and institutional breakdown are turning [1], [2]. Along with the globalization and transnational governance, the international law's influence has grown, which at times requires coordinated actions to deal with systemic injustice, corruption, or violations of human rights [3], [4].

In the last twenty years, the international community has taken different kinds of interventions such as diplomatic missions, peacekeeping forces, or legal reforms trying to stabilize the unstable states and support the justice systems [5], [6]. Such actions are usually based on the assumption that external support for institutional strengthening brings about legal compliance, low crime rates, and respect for rights [7]. Nevertheless, the evidence that such interventions have been effective is still very limited, especially in the case of quantitative, cross-country comparisons of justice-related indicators.

A lot of academics have pointed out that the aspect of constitutional jurisprudence has played an important part in determining a country's justice system as a whole, mainly when it comes to minority rights and the development of gender justice [8], [9]. The role of judicial independence as a guard against crime and a means of upholding human rights is already well known [10]. For example, the compliance with global legal standards like those of the International Criminal Court or the United Nations Human Rights Council can be considered as a reflection of a government's commitment to the rule of law [11].

The recent writings also point out a link between the transnational crime and the ineffective judicial systems [12]. The fact that no one is able to legitimately deal with the international crimes like human trafficking or cross-border bribery usually comes down to the absence of proper legal institutions and the lack of international cooperation [13]. Thus, the intervention mechanisms are not only reactive but also preventive tools in the governance of global justice [14].

The present study aims to fill the research gap by utilizing statistical methods to evaluate the relationship between the international interventions and the critical justice indicators: Judicial Independence Score, Crime Rate Index, International Legal Compliance, and Human Rights Score. The paper will employ a combination of descriptive statistics, Welch's ANOVA, alongside visual diagnostics like Q-Q plots and confidence interval graphs, with the objective of providing strong empirical support for the idea that international involvement leads to measurable improvements in the justice systems. The findings will thus be an essential input in the ongoing policy discussions regarding the legitimacy, effectiveness, and extent of international legal interventions in domestic matters [15].

2. RELATED WORK

Over the past decades, numerous scholars have investigated the intersection between international intervention and domestic legal systems. The literature reveals a growing consensus that international influence can positively reshape legal and institutional outcomes in fragile or transitioning democracies [16], [17]. Legal interventions, be they judicial, military, or advisory, are often based on the same premises of human rights promotion, rule of law, and global peacekeeping which are the main objectives of [18].

One important plurality of studies is a study of the independence of the judiciary, which is another core ingredient for good governance. It has been found that countries with robust judicial autonomy tend to exhibit stronger anti-corruption frameworks and higher public trust in legal institutions [19]. As stated the independence of the judiciary is one of the elements that prevent and protect the executive from doing an overreach, especially in cases of political unrest [20].

At the same time the Crime Rate Index has been used as a common proxy for the stability of the institution and the efficacy of law enforcement. According to LaFree and Tseloni countries that have received international reform assistance often show great reductions in violent and organized crime [21].

The reductions are attributed to law enforcement directly intervening but also to the reforms taking place which are favored by international donors and organizations [22].

A different area of study scrutinizes International Legal Compliance which judges the compliance of a state with treaties, conventions, and rulings of international courts. The monitoring and pressure activities performed by international actors lead states to establish compliance with global standards and international treaties according to established evidence [23]. Legal pluralism together with cross-border communication networks has created essential conditions that enforce compliance with International Criminal Court and regional human rights court decisions [24].

The role of constitutional jurisprudence in this context has been increasingly recognized. Comparative studies have demonstrated how global constitutional principles such as gender justice, minority rights, and separation of powers have been incorporated into national legal frameworks through foreign legal assistance and court-to-court dialogue [25], [26]. The international norms that have spread their presence like wildfire have also played an important part in the legal reforms that took place in the countries that were undergoing transitions or had just come out of conflicts [27].

Some authors put forward the standpoint that, although international interventions are generally good, there are some critical views about them as well. The issues raised include the infraction on national sovereignty, cultural differences, and the danger of imposing uniform solutions for different situations [28]. Though, newer empirical research indicates that, through collaborative designing, interventions can produce sustainable legal development along with the local autonomy being supported [29], [30].

On the other hand, there are still very few empirical studies that have taken the quantitative statistical techniques route to assess how big (or small) the impact of interventions has been on the justice related indicators. The bulk of the literature that is available is based on case studies or normative arguments, which results in a lack of knowledge about the larger, data-driven impact of such initiatives. By using statistical analysis, such as Welch's ANOVA and Q-Q diagnostics, this study intends to be the one that addresses the gap in understanding the empirical validation of the benefits of international legal intervention that had been theorized.

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Data Source and Variables

This study utilized a secondary dataset comprising 200 observations from a cross-national sample. The data was arranged in a way that allowed a comparison of the two groups of countries: the first group being those experiencing international intervention (International Intervention = 1) and the second group being those not experiencing it (International Intervention = 0). The main dependent variables that were examined are as follows:

- **Human Rights Score:** a composite index evaluating civil liberties and human rights protection;
- **Judicial Independence Score:** a metric assessing the autonomy of the judiciary from political influence;
- **International Legal Compliance:** an indicator reflecting adherence to international law and legal standards;
- **Crime Rate Index:** a national-level index quantifying the prevalence of crime.

3.2 Descriptive Analysis

In order to depict the central tendencies (mean, median, and mode) and the variability (standard deviation and range), descriptive statistics were computed for both groups separately. The examination of distributional characteristics (such as skewness and kurtosis) was conducted, and Shapiro-Wilk tests were performed to analyze the normality of each variable.

3.3 Assumption Testing

We tested the preliminary assumption of variance homogeneity and normality prior to conducting inferential tests.

- Normality could be verified from the Q-Q plots of standardized residuals and also tested statistically with the Shapiro-Wilk test.
- Homogeneity of variances was determined with Levene's test, where $p > 0.05$ as the significance level indicated equal variances among the groups.

3.4 Inferential Statistics

The researchers used Welch's ANOVA as their main statistical test because the two groups they studied had different group sizes and showed slight problems with homogeneity. The method operates effectively when there are unequal variances and different sample sizes between groups. Three separate ANOVA models were run for:

- Judicial Independence Score
- International Legal Compliance
- Crime Rate Index

Significance was determined at the 0.05 alpha level. The study reported ANOVA F-values and p-values and their associated degrees of freedom which included df1 and df2.

3.5 Data Visualization

The research team created 95 percent confidence interval mean plots for both groups total dependent variables. The visualizations demonstrated group differences through their magnitude and directional relationship. The researchers used Q-Q plots to check whether the residuals followed a normal distribution.

3.6 Software

All analyses used Jamovi statistical software (Version 2.4) which is an open-source platform that operates on R and provides users with easy access to advanced statistical functions and professional-grade graphical output.

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The research data follows closely the theoretical frameworks of global law and justice governance. According to liberal institutionalism, international organizations and external interventions act as norm diffusers, promoting rule of law, transparency, and institutional capacity within sovereign states [16], [18]. The observed higher Judicial Independence Scores in intervention countries theoretically support this claim. The scores indicate that external oversight mechanisms which include monitoring missions and legal aid reforms and judicial training programs create an effect which protects domestic legal institutions from both executive control and partisan influence.

The improvement in International Legal Compliance demonstrates the core principle of constructivist theory according to which states acquire global norms through their continuous interactions with international legal systems and their exposure to peer-based enforcement methods. As states interact more deeply with entities like the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, or regional legal frameworks (e.g., the European Court of Human Rights), they begin to align domestic laws with international standards [23], [26].

The significantly lower Crime Rate Index in intervention states corresponds with theories of legal modernization and state-building, which argue that international interventions not only rebuild justice infrastructure but also increase the deterrence value of law enforcement systems [21], [22]. As institutions become more legitimate and effective, citizens are more likely to comply with laws, and criminal behavior declines as legal consequences become more certain and impartial.

The theory of constitutional jurisprudence establishes that international legal standards which protect minority rights and gender equality and maintain independent judicial systems can affect national constitutions through transnational legal interactions and consultative decisions and technical support. This helps explain the increased legal compliance and fairness in legal systems observed in this study [25], [27].

The study results from a normative justice perspective support Rawlsian justice theory because it requires fairness and equal access and protection of fundamental rights. The human rights framework enables international interventions to function as corrective mechanisms which restore social and gender equality in nations where local judicial systems demonstrate bias and insufficient capacity to deliver justice [19], [30].

The theoretical insights explain the observed positive relationships between the empirical data. The research results confirm current legal and institutional theories while developing a strong basis for increasing international partnership in justice system changes.

4.1 Discussion

The study results demonstrate that international intervention leads to improved justice outcomes through their proven effectiveness. The countries which received such interventions demonstrated enhanced judicial independence and increased legal compliance together with a dramatic decrease in their crime rates. The study results confirm previous research which found that external assistance helps institutions develop their ability to withstand challenges while maintaining their commitment to rule-based systems of governance [16], [18], [23].

The increase in Judicial Independence Scores in intervention countries likely reflects reforms targeting judicial autonomy, including measures like constitutional amendments, anti-corruption efforts, and the establishment of independent oversight bodies. The improvement in International Legal Compliance shows that countries successfully adopted international legal standards together with their treaty commitments and their participation in multilateral legal institutions such as the International Criminal Court or UN mechanisms [24], [29].

The intervention group shows the most striking result through its major reduction in Crime Rate Index. The results demonstrate a link between effective legal systems and public security which delivers a concrete measurement of social advantages that reach beyond courtroom-based solutions [21], [22].

These outcomes also affirm the broader argument in constitutional jurisprudence that justice is not solely a national affair but part of a global governance agenda that requires collaboration, oversight, and when necessary, intervention [9], [27]. The results show strong statistical evidence, but they require careful interpretation. The study results show that cross-sectional data cannot establish causality because unobserved factors which include economic development and political stability will affect the results.

Descriptives

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Justice Indicators by International Intervention Status

Descriptives						
	International Intervention	Human Rights Score	Judicial Independence Score	Intl Legal Compliance	Country ID	Crime Rate Index
N	0	108	108	108	108	108
	1	92	92	92	92	92
Missing	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1	0	0	0	0	0
Mean	0	69.3	60.2	64.9		49.6
	1	77.9	65.0	73.4		37.6
Median	0	69.2	60.0	64.8		49.2
	1	78.8	65.3	73.3		38.2
Mode	0	43.8 ^a	33.0 ^a	26.1 ^a		12.9 ^a
	1	58.4 ^a	38.5 ^a	45.5 ^a		8.99 ^a
Standard deviation	0	9.11	10.6	11.0		15.7
	1	9.58	9.76	12.7		13.9
Minimum	0	43.8	33.0	26.1		12.9
	1	58.4	38.5	45.5		8.99

Maximum	0	91.9	86.3	91.3		96.2
	1	105	90.7	117		70.9
Kurtosis	0	0.135	-0.338	0.598		0.163
	1	-0.0413	0.260	0.755		-0.614
Std. error	0	0.461	0.461	0.461		0.461
kurtosis	1	0.498	0.498	0.498		0.498
Shapiro-	0	0.992	0.992	0.988		0.993
Wilk W	1	0.985	0.993	0.984		0.989
Shapiro-	0	0.809	0.774	0.442		0.865
Wilk p	1	0.400	0.910	0.332		0.652

^a More than one mode exists, only the first is reported

To investigate the association between international intervention and key justice indicators, a comprehensive statistical analysis was conducted using descriptive measures and normality diagnostics. The sample was divided into two groups based on intervention status (0 and 1 for International Intervention). Descriptive statistics Table 1 revealed that countries receiving intervention scored consistently higher across all governance and justice metrics. The mean Human Rights Score increased from 69.3 (non-intervention) to 77.9 (intervention) while Judicial Independence improved from 60.2 to 65.0 and International Legal Compliance rose from 64.9 to 73.4. The intervention group experienced a significant decline in the Crime Rate Index which dropped from 49.6 to 37.6.

Shapiro Wilk tests were conducted to validate assumptions of normality with the test results showing p-values above 0.05 for most variables in both groups which indicated approximate normality. Q-Q plots for standardized residuals provided additional evidence that supported this conclusion. The Q-Q plot for Human Rights Score residuals which shows strong linear alignment between residuals and theoretical quantiles for both intervention and non-intervention groups Figure 1. Figure 2 shows Judicial Independence Score residuals which display only small variations at the ends of the distribution. Figure 3 shows the International Legal Compliance residuals which followed normal distribution patterns. Figure 4 presents the Q-Q plot for Crime Rate Index residuals which show that parametric testing results can be trusted. The plots show that residuals achieved normal distribution which enables researchers to conduct their subsequent inferential tests that include t-tests and ANOVA tests. The overall findings support the hypothesis that international intervention correlates with enhanced governance quality and crime reduction.

Plots

Human Rights Score







Figure 1. Q-Q Plot of Standardized Residuals for Human Rights Score

Judicial Independence Score**Figure 2.** Q-Q Plot of Standardized Residuals for Judicial Independence Score**Intl Legal Compliance****Figure 3.** Q-Q Plot of Standardized Residuals for International Legal Compliance**Crime Rate Index****Figure 4.** Q-Q Plot of Standardized Residuals for Crime Rate Index**One-Way ANOVA****Table 2.** Welch's ANOVA Results for Justice Indicators by Intervention Group

One-Way ANOVA (Welch's)				
	F	DF1	DF2	P
Judicial Independence Score	10.9	1	197	0.001

Crime Rate Index	32.7	1	198	<.001
Intl Legal Compliance	25.5	1	181	<.001

Assumption Checks

Table 3. Levene's Test for Homogeneity of Variances across Groups


Homogeneity of Variances Test (Levene's)				
	F	DF1	DF2	P
Judicial Independence Score	0.593	1	198	0.442
Crime Rate Index	0.433	1	198	0.511
Intl Legal Compliance	0.973	1	198	0.325

A Welch's ANOVA was performed because of the potential variance heterogeneity. The results, which are displayed in [Table 2](#), showed that there were statistically significant differences among the intervention groups in all three variables. There was a significant effect of intervention in the case of Judicial Independence Score, $F(1, 197) = 10.9$, $p = 0.001$. In the same way, the Crime Rate Index pointed to a huge difference, $F(1, 198) = 32.7$, $p < .001$, and International Legal Compliance was also significantly higher in the group that had received intervention, $F(1, 181) = 25.5$, $p < .001$. Thus, these results suggest that the status of the intervention is a considerable factor in affecting the aforementioned justice metrics. Levene's test [Table 3](#) confirmed the assumption checks and showed that the variances were equal across the groups, as all the p-values were $> .3$. Hence, ANOVA was the appropriate analysis method.



The mean graphs with 95% confidence intervals are given for each of the variables in [Figure 5](#), [Figure 7](#) clearly showing the differences among the groups. [Figure 5](#) shows a higher mean Judicial Independence Score in the intervention group (~65 vs. ~60), while [Figure 6](#) depicts a noticeable drop in Crime Rate Index under intervention (~38 vs. ~50). [Figure 7](#) demonstrates that the trend exists because International Legal Compliance levels in countries with intervention reach 74 percent while countries without it achieve 66 percent compliance. The graphical results display international interventions which lead to better judicial independence and legal compliance and reduced crime rates according to statistical evidence.

Plots

Judicial Independence Score



[Figure 5.](#) Mean Judicial Independence Score with 95% Confidence Interval by Intervention Status

Crime Rate Index**Figure 6.** Mean Crime Rate Index with 95% Confidence Interval by Intervention Status**Intl Legal Compliance****Figure 7.** Mean International Legal Compliance Score with 95% Confidence Interval by Intervention Status**5. CONCLUSION**

The researchers have and rightly so concluded from their work, which they still consider part of the ongoing debate, that international interventions never the less, play a constructive role in improving outcomes related to justice. The countries that were deemed to have such interventions showed by far a higher level of Human Rights Scores, a more significant degree of Judicial Independence and, at the same time, they were also involved in international legal compliance. Moreover, during the same period, these countries had lower crime rates. In other words, the transnational efforts to hold the legal standards and to protect human rights had a significant impact as they became very clearly visible in the above-mentioned results based on strong statistical evidence. The dependability of the findings is further established through the normality diagnostics and the confidence intervals that are visually represented, thus confirming the reliability of the analysis.

Conversely, this research does have its drawbacks. The dataset used is currently only cross-sectional and therefore it does not consider any changes over time or the duration/intensity of the

interventions. Also, there are some cultural, geographical, or political factors that were not included in this research model that might influence the results and were not taken into consideration. Future research should try to use data that spans a long period, in order to show the changes in the interventions over time. Studies across different continents or legal systems could be enlightening in terms of the effectiveness of the context. Furthermore, the integration of qualitative data such as expert opinions, policy reviews, or case law could make the empirical insights richer and more understandable by providing a contextual basis. A shifting international law landscape, particularly because cybercrime and cross-border corruption issues are taking shape, may also translate into venturing into an unknown territory.

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Author Contributions Statement

Name of Author	C	M	So	Va	Fo	I	R	D	O	E	Vi	Su	P	Fu
Fauziah Ani	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

C : Conceptualization

M : Methodology

So : Software

Va : Validation

Fo : Formal analysis

I : Investigation

R : Resources

D : Data Curation

O : Writing - Original Draft

E : Writing - Review & Editing

Vi : Visualization

Su : Supervision

P : Project administration

Fu : Funding acquisition

Conflict of Interest Statement

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this paper.

Informed Consent

All participants were informed about the purpose of the study, and their voluntary consent was obtained prior to data collection.

Ethical Approval

The study was conducted in compliance with the ethical principles outlined in the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the relevant institutional authorities.

Data Availability

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

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