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## Russia vs. Ukraine War: India's stance

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**Abstract:** *On February 24, Russian troops came into Ukraine from Belarus in the north, Crimea in the south, and the east. Multiple lines of attack suggested that the Russian military wanted to quickly take the capital, Kyiv, overthrow the democratically elected government, and take over as much as the eastern two-thirds of Ukraine. Since the war started on February 24, Russia has been wrong about four things: that the Ukrainian government would fall and Russian forces would quickly take Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities; that the European Union would struggle to show resolve and respond to this aggression; that the "Western world" would react in a split and uncertain way; and that the rest of the world would not condemn Russia's invasion. Russia has been building up its military along its border with Ukraine, which wants to join NATO. Russia has said that its deployment of troops is a response to the steady expansion of NATO to the east. Russia says that it is doing these things to protect its own security. The stance that India has taken on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is being applauded everywhere therefore, the study highlighted and analysed the India's stand on Russia – Ukraine war by adopting descriptive cum analytical method to reach on conclusion also the study utilised extensively thematic analytical tool MAXQDA for qualitative investigation to explain and analyse the India's stand on Russia – Ukraine war.*

**Keywords:** *War, Conflict, Military, Attack and NATO Etc.*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. When conflict breaks out, we learn that as humans, "we have not yet crept on all fours from the primitive stage of our history," as Leon Trotsky stated 110 years ago. In a Pavlovian way, we also revert to caveman-era herding. When it exists, the drive to understand is overpowered by the need to choose sides and naively follow the majority. Russia's recognition of rebel regions in eastern Ukraine (Donbas region)- Donetsk and Luhanska was followed by an invasion to "demilitarise" and "denazify" Ukraine. This move by Moscow challenges the global order by rejecting the 1975 Helsinki agreement's inviolability of European boundaries. Individuals, groups, communities, and countries can be in conflict.



Disagreement threatens their needs, interests, or worries. People are threatened physically, emotionally, politically, socially, etc. Values, culture, beliefs, experience, and gender shape perceptions. Conflict can be a creative learning opportunity. Parties must have a plan to resolve their issue. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has caused harm. It's growing.

India wavering over Ukraine? Perhaps. Anything that position India picked, it would have been reprimanded. As a rising power, India's insignificant assumptions are troublesome. India has more effect on emergency tact than before. India upheld the Soviet Union's 1979 intrusion of Afghanistan; however Indira Gandhi looked for a territorial methodology against it. Neither one of the methodologies changed Soviet direct. India couldn't uphold the two sides, so it remained nonpartisan. In Prime Minister Modi's discussions with Presidents Putin and Zelenskyy on 24 and 26 February, and Foreign Secretary Shringla's media collaboration on 25 February, India encouraged for "discourse," "discontinuance of savagery," and "assurance" of Indian nationals

Conflict is hard to understand. The Ukrainian president's decision to turn down the EU's association agreement is making things worse between Ukraine and Russia. People and the country did not agree with the president's choice, so they protested. Part of the conflict is about money. Crimea's climate is popular. This brings in tourists and helps the economy of the Ukrainians. It's easy to grow wheat, corn, and sunflowers. No water emergency. Crimea digs for iron ore and makes chemicals. UKr Ago Consult says that 1.6 million tonnes of grain have been sent. Russia was worried that Ukraine would make a deal with the EU to work together and then buy cheap goods from the EU. All Russians and Ukrainians took part in the war. Russia is in charge because it sends troops to Ukraine and takes over Crimea, which Ukraine used to control. Crimea gives Russia its full support. The Crimean cabinet has been thrown out. Russia benefits from keeping the war going. In Ukraine, they can grow.

New Delhi's interests make India different. India has avoided publicly criticizing Russia despite its professed concern with Russian behavior. India called for "respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states," a "immediate cessation of violence and hostilities," regret that diplomacy was abandoned, urged the concerned states to "return to it," and reiterated that "dialogue is the only answer to settling differences and disputes, however daunting that may seem right now." In a coded critique of Russian behaviour, India's External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said the world order is based on international law, the UN Charter, and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty.

### **Research Objective**

When it comes to the realm of international politics, India is the largest democratic nation in the world and possesses a robust foreign policy that is basically built on the values of peaceful co-existence, friendliness, and cooperation among all of the countries of the globe. In general, the primary objectives of a nation's foreign policy should be to assist in the protection of the nation's national interests, national security, ideological goals, and economic success. In the year 2022, Ukraine and the anatomy of India's neutrality is a topic that is being discussed in every nook and cranny of the world; thus, the study identifies the aim concerning the Russian invasion of Ukraine and India's response to take a stance on the subject.



## **2. METHODOLOGY**

The article is both descriptive and analytical in nature, and it makes extensive use of Secondary data culled from trustworthy sources such books, websites, and newspaper stories, several Indian reports and several international journals and periodicals, was analyzed to its claims qualitatively through thematic analysis tool MAXQDA.

## **3. DISCUSSION, RESULTS**

Russia has been militarising its border with NATO-aspiring Ukraine. Russia deployed troops in response to NATO's eastward advance. Russia says its actions are for national security. Russia has tried to keep Ukraine in its orbit since the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991. In 2014, a separatist rebellion began in Ukraine's eastern industrial heartland, Donetsk Basin. Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea gave it a maritime advantage in the region. US and EU have committed to protect Ukraine's borders. The assault on Ukraine by Russia and its call to stop NATO's eastward expansion could lead to war in Europe. Following air and missile raids, Russian forces crossed the country's northern, eastern, and southern borders with tanks and infantry. Numerous Ukrainians fought back. The Ukraine has dreaded conflict since Russia's takeover of Crimea in 2014. Russia claims Ukraine as part of its own country and opposes Ukraine's growth to the west. Vladimir Putin wants to reclaim the former Soviet nation. He called for an end to hostilities in Ukraine. Russia and Ukraine were both part of the USSR, which had 15 republics, before 1991.

### **Conflict's beginning**

As of early 2021, hostilities between Russia and Ukraine, a former Soviet country, have been on the rise. Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy petitioned US Vice President Joe Biden in January 2013 for his country to be allowed to join NATO. After sending soldiers to the Ukrainian border for "training exercises" last spring, Russia ramped up its presence there in the fall. The United States sensationalised a Russian troop build-up, and Vice President Joe Biden vowed to punish Russia if it invaded Ukraine. For Russia, an official US promise that NATO forces will not deploy in Eastern Europe, particularly in Ukraine, must be legally enforceable. According to Vladimir Putin, Ukraine is nothing more than a US puppet and never existed. Russia and Ukraine have fought each other in the past, but this is not the first time. Ukraine was overrun by pro-Russian rebels in 2014, and the Ukrainian army has been fighting them ever since. Crimea was taken by Russia in 2014. After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, social and cultural relations weakened. Russia went on the offensive after the 2014 fall of Ukraine's pro-Russian president. More than 14,000 people have died in the east. Russia and Ukraine signed Minsk to stop the brutal Donbas conflict. As long as the violence continues, Russia will send "peacekeepers." Moscow is annexing Ukrainian land, alleges. Russia and Ukraine's escalating animosity affects the EU. EU and US sanctioned Russian enterprises, most of which are NATO members. Putin and Macron met in Moscow to defuse tensions. A diplomatic solution to the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict is being offered by India.



### **Russia's Aggression**

Russia wanted Ukraine's inclusion in Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), a 2015 free trade deal. Ukraine was expected to play a major role with its large market, advanced agriculture, and industrial output. Ukraine didn't join.

### **Geopolitical factors**

Russia believes that NATO's "enlargement" to the east threatens its interests and has requested for formal security guarantees. NATO, lead by the U.S., plans to construct missile defence systems in Eastern Europe to counter Russia's ICBMs.

### **Russia-Ukraine Crisis: India**

India would have to choose between the West and Russia if Russia invaded. India's interests benefit from close relations with Russia. India must maintain a strong strategic alliance with Russia and cannot join any Western plan to isolate Russia. S-400 might lead to U.S. CAATSA sanctions on India. A US-Russia deal might damage relations with China. This could help India rebuild ties with Russia. The problem with Ukraine is economic and geopolitical globalisation. Any Russia-China improvement affects India. Threatening thousands of Indian students is the strong Indian diaspora in the region. Even as it swung toward Ukraine, India received Russia's support of its "independent" posture and American recognition of its "development." The US called India's relationship with Russia "unique" and "acceptable." The US State Department recalled a cable directing American diplomats to criticise India and the UAE for their "neutral" stance on Ukraine, which puts them in "Russia's camp". Despite harsh sentiments, media supported India. The New York Times said India must evaluate "geostrategic considerations, especially with China," but Foreign Policy praised India's "tough diplomatic stance." AP said that India was "diversifying its defence procurements"

### **Ukraine war hampers India-Russia ties**

As per the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, India imported 46% of Russia's protection sends out during 2017-2021. Russia would move weapons from products to the Ukraine war even without sanctions, making it hard for India to purchase Russian gear. Russia moved toward China for military weaponry to meet setbacks. Assuming Russia's tactical supplies and mechanical exchanges to India were halted without equivalent Western supplies, the alliance to adjust China would be in danger. Again and again, we talk about India's protection attaches with Russia. In 1971, the Soviets acted to their greatest advantage, not India's, and didn't uphold India doing battle with Pakistan. Previous representative and author Chandrashekhar Dasgupta contends the Soviets deferred endorsing India's new arms demand until after the Simla Summit to forestall Indian regional additions in Kashmir. After Pakistan's misfortune in the east, India pronounced a détente, finishing the contention. Could Russia follow Indian Ukraine counsel? America and Ukraine upheld India's proposal to arrange a tranquil goal, yet not Russia, which controlled the story. Moscow said something by supporting India. India's connections to Russia are significant, yet would they say they are corresponding?

### **US pursues own interests**

Sanctions against Russia will influence India's protection supplies. Approvals could undermine



India's shipments of S-400 rockets, Akula-class submarines, A-203 rifles, and BrahMos rockets. Shringla said "authorizations will hurt our current associations," yet foreseeing how is too soon. In punishing India under CAATSA, the US should analyse "geostrategic ramifications, remarkably with China," said James O'Brien, President Biden's State Department possibility to oversee punishments. Before the contention, we don't have the foggiest idea what will occur. As US protection supplies to India rise, approvals might be stopped. From zero out of 2008 to \$15 billion out of 2019, these climbed decisively. The US is India's third- biggest safeguard provider from 2017-2021, with 12% of the market. Authorizations will upgrade Russia's dependence on China, subverting US relations with Russia and India. John Mearsheimer contends we ought to zero in on China. "Russia is important for our China-adjusting alliance." mChina might win The US advance toward Europe is perilous for India, which faces China. Debilitating Russia harms US Indo-Pacific methodology. How do India's S-400 authorizations prevent China? Beijing could incite in the South China Sea or along the India-China line. With the probability of developing tension from China, in Taiwan as well as in Ladakh (some foresee China would attract examples from Ukraine to broadcast Pakistan-involved Kashmir autonomous), India needs to introspect on technique and strategies. China and Russia have consented to battle "unfamiliar powers' endeavors to sabotage security and soundness" in Taiwan and Ukraine. China might have energized the Russian attack. Russia's dependence on China compromises India's multipolarity. Power- sharing past the US and China is troublesome. India can incline internal; this is a constant update. With the probability of developing strain from China, in Taiwan as well as in Ladakh (some foresee China would attract examples from Ukraine to announce Pakistan-involved Kashmir autonomous), India needs to introspect on procedure and strategies. India should take a hindrance action as the Himalayas liquefy. India should seek after Russia as a directing effect on China and the US as an offset.

### **India's stand in Russia-Ukraine war**

India's national interests necessitate neutrality as Russia's war in Ukraine proceeds. Here are New Delhi's foreign policy challenges. India's stance to the Ukraine-Russia war is a global riddle. Delhi continues to "maintain strategic autonomy," meaning it refuses to stand with the West, mainly the U.S. and NATO partners. While part of Western alliance's like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, it buys Russian arms and oil. India abstained from votes to censure Russia for its unjustified aggression on Ukraine at the UN Security Council and General Assembly. Abstaining from Russian resolutions, India has tried to balance its relationship with the West and Russia, with whom it has profound historical and geopolitical links. India's decision to abstain from the Russia-Ukraine issue implies it's balancing both countries. In its neutral stance, India must introspect its balanced foreign policy vis-à-vis Moscow due to regional geopolitical considerations and open new windows for other partners, including the West. The article explains India's worries and takeaways from the Russia-Ukraine Crisis. It also examines how the growing Sino- Russian alliance affects India's security. India's impartial stance on the Ukraine crisis showed its independent foreign policy. India chose Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as its post-independence foreign policy while retaining a cordial relationship with the former Soviet Union. India recognises that Russia cannot remain the sole supply of defence equipment if more sanctions are imposed owing to the simmering situation.



India needs a strong relationship with Russia since a tighter engagement with China would harm India's security. India's reliance on Russia extends beyond military equipment and technology. Russia supplies India with crude and edible oil. India's willingness to acquire 15 million barrels of oil from Russia at a bargain (\$35 per barrel) shows its need for oil imports. The Indian government's Ukraine policy may be characterised as "strategic ambivalence." It is the only plausible option for New Delhi. In India's opinion, alienating Russia could jeopardise its security, thus it has decided not to publicly criticise it. China and Pakistan have affected India's stance on the Russian attack. Maintaining connections with Moscow, New Delhi believes, will prevent Russia from deepening ties with China and forging new strategic alliances with Pakistan, all of which are considered as imminent and chronic worries. Russia is preferred by China and Pakistan over India. The proximity of Moscow to both India and Pakistan is vital to Delhi. These arguments have led India to the conclusion that refraining from direct criticism of Russia enables it to prevent the establishment of a Sino-Russian alliance, which would be counterproductive to India's fundamental interests. New Delhi has not denounced Russia's activities in Ukraine in order to defend Indian interests in global decision-making. Without allies, India wants to be a dominant force. India's development is best safeguarded by peace and the existence of several rival power centres. Along these lines, neither unipolarity nor bipolarity, in which India has major areas of strength for a to one post, serve India's inclinations: the previous makes not many motivations for the prevailing ability to help India's ascent, while the last option might convince one extraordinary power, similar to the US, to help India in its opposition with a nearby opponent, similar to China, yet New Delhi is worried that Washington's asking cost might be excessively high and monstrous. The country that represents the greatest danger to Indian interests is the United States, yet India has zero desire to formalize a coalition with them. India favours a multiple worldwide framework that permits it to switch among numerous and various posts without creating enduring binds with a solitary country or association. The contention in Ukraine debilitates Russia's power while reinforcing China's when Sino-Indian relations are tense. Moscow requests help from New Delhi with the expectation that their bet will succeed. Much more US collaboration with India will not have the option to persuade Moscow to stop Russia given the meaning of Moscow to New Delhi's inclinations. The intrusion of Ukraine by Russia was seen by numerous Indian vital specialists as a sensible reaction to "ruthless international relations." India still values the liberal international system. It does so mostly for political reasons due to its ambivalence with various components of the system. Liberalism is a Western invention, and India's colonial history has made it difficult to accept it. As a result, India has been hesitant to expand democracy in the last decade, choosing representative democracy above liberal democracy. The pledge of New Delhi to preserve its economy from physical and virtual infiltration that could limit state power and destroy part of its population's wealth is incompatible with free and open trade. Despite the fact that India and China have an uncomfortably close official posture on freedom of navigation, Beijing's aggression has forced New Delhi into functional solidarity with Washington. According to one of America's foremost specialists on India, the country's support for the liberal international order is "limited and cautious." Indian ascension to greatpower status can occur only in an open international system comprised of numerous countries with whom India may collaborate and cooperate. India has no basic commitment to the free international system due to its lack of power. As long as India's national interests are not jeopardised, New



Delhi will pursue its own objectives in the long run, even if it means breaking the order's core rule barring the use of force for territorial acquisition. This is because India prioritises its own long-term interests over the cost to the global system. Since Beijing is an immediate enemy, New Delhi is uninterested about India's irregularity with Russia in contrast with China; India will defy China steadfastly, as a team with different nations when vital, while summoning the significance of the standards based worldwide request to legitimize its decisions. The needs of Indian capital will outweigh this obligation. The Russian attack of Ukraine sets majority rules systems and absolutisms in opposition to one another; however Indian pioneers, similar to their American partners, decline to remember it. According to India's viewpoint, the ongoing stalemate's various debates are denied. On account of Ukraine, New Delhi considers the differentiations among popular governments and dictatorships to be coincidental, in view of public interests. India has consistently acted in international concerns as per how political pragmatists view countries. There are several possible outcomes that could undermine India's current strategy of not publicly condemning Russian actions, such as the decline of Russian power, a strong Sino-Russian relationship, or harsh US sanctions, all of which would make the immediate costs of New Delhi's neutrality far more painful than the benefits it provides. First and foremost, Indian officials are concerned. They believe Washington will be more forgiving of New Delhi's public neutrality toward Russia, even if it publicly criticises New Delhi. According to Indian authorities, as long as India helps China rein in its aggression, the US will leave them off the hook in the Indo-Pacific. To say the least, Delhi's decision to court the Quad, China, and Russia is wise. The cost of defending India's values looked to be worthwhile. "As with every country, we examine the world around us," Jaishankar said. To our benefit, we understand how to protect and enhance our interests. We now have additional options. These threats are significantly more serious than Russia's declining power, but India has no credible options other than to appear neutral. We can only hope for the best and pray for a better conclusion for New Delhi and Washington by not penalising Russia so harshly that Moscow draws closer to Beijing, which would be detrimental to both countries in the long run. Such goals impede the convergence of values between the United States and India. Despite receiving a "no ovation" for its Ukraine stance, India's challenging neutrality with Russia is unlikely to change anytime soon.

### **3. CONCLUSION**

The ongoing Russia-Ukraine crisis will have an impact on India's geopolitics and economics. India approaches national security in a balanced manner. It necessitates a pragmatic approach and balance between Russia and the United States. India must quickly resolve territorial disputes with China. Through public-private partnerships, India could expand the 'Atmanibhar Bharat Abhiyan' and 'Make in India' programmes to promote indigenization of defence equipment. Diversify weaponry imports and strengthen ties with neighbours. India's interests include interactions with its neighbours. Modi has altered India's international image. When India speaks, all nations listen. Everyone applauds India's stand on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Opponents of India hailed the country's attitude. India has chosen peace and a complete cessation of warfare. Diplomatically, India continues to demand an immediate cessation to violence and hostility. We welcome dialogue between Ukraine and Russia,



particularly between their leaders. The Prime Minister has contacted them both. Sergey Lavrov was informed this in Delhi. If India can assist, we will gladly contribute, reinforcing India's pledge to give humanitarian aid to Ukraine. War never solves a problem; it just makes it worse. Rather than fighting, find a political solution because it makes people's life more difficult. As history should have taught us, war and invasion are never acceptable ways to resolve international conflicts. Many problems can be solved through discussion and conversation. The confrontation between Russia and Ukraine emphasizes the need of peace and fairness. Peace and justice are always preferable to other outcomes; sacrificing lives for advancement is never acceptable. Throughout history, war has resulted in death, destruction, and other issues. Why do we use firearms to settle problems when we can talk? Things could get worse if the essential steps to resolve the Ukraine crisis are not taken. A significant escalation will almost certainly result in unprecedented slaughter and damage. According to Roberta Metsola, President of the European Parliament, EU neighbours are concerned that Russia's conflict in Ukraine will expand to them.

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